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AUSTRALIAN CRIME COMMISSION



SUBMISSION TO:

The Parliamentary Joint Committee on the
Australian Crime Commission

INQUIRY INTO:

The future impact of serious and
organised crime on Australian society



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Inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian Society

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Introduction

The *Commonwealth and States and Territories Agreement on Terrorism and Multi-Jurisdictional Crime*, made in April 2002, noted that "... international and organised criminal groups (do) not respect state or national borders, and their activities (can) also result in major harm to all Australians". In the Agreement, Leaders agreed to strengthen the fight against organised crime by replacing the National Crime Authority with an Australian Crime Commission.

To give effect to this resolution, Commonwealth, State and Territory governments agreed that the Australian Crime Commission (ACC) would be constituted by Commonwealth legislation as a Commonwealth law enforcement agency, supported by State and Territory legislation.

This unique underpinning characterises the approach that has been taken by governments to combat the threat from serious and organised crime in Australia. It recognises and supports the need for strong collaboration between law enforcement agencies and, as reflected in the *Australian Crime Commission Act 2002* (the Act), acknowledges that special powers that go beyond those usually available to police agencies are essential.

In responding to the Terms of Reference for the Parliamentary Joint Committee on the Australian Crime Commission's inquiry into the future impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society, this submission draws on intelligence and information developed by the ACC in undertaking its functions under the Act. It includes judgments based on ongoing cooperation and consultation with partner agencies, and the monitoring of national, regional and global criminal environments.

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Background

Serious and organised crime¹ encompasses a wide range of criminal activities, from the importation, manufacture and distribution of illicit drugs through to sophisticated frauds. Organised crime may also blend criminal activity with legitimate business structures and processes, or operate through the corruption of public and private officials.

Many of the so called 'traditional' areas in which organised criminal groups engage, such as the importation of illicit drugs, have no parallel in the legitimate economy. Other markets have emerged, however, as these groups identify and exploit vulnerabilities in sections of the legitimate economy to create new criminal niches.

Serious and organised crime is a significant and ongoing global concern. It is pervasive, multi-faceted and accompanied by massive social and economic costs to society. These costs are not only monetary, but include loss of profit or commercial viability of legitimate businesses, damage to the health and well-being of the community, increased costs of goods or services, reduced supply or availability of critical services, and an actual or perceived reduction in community safety.

The fundamental characteristics of serious and organised crime are that it involves substantial planning and organisation and the use of sophisticated methods and techniques, and is primarily motivated by financial gain. The nature of the criminal activity undertaken by organised criminal groups is fluid, responding to a range of influences including market dynamics, law enforcement focus and emerging opportunities.

¹ The definition of serious and organised crime for the purposes of the *Australian Crime Commission Act 2002* is at sub-section 4(1) of the Act.

Term of reference (a) - Future trends in serious and organised crime activities, practices and methods and their impact on Australian society

All organised criminal activity results in some form of negative impact on society. This may be through direct harm associated with the criminal activity, or as a result of indirect or flow-on consequences to secondary sectors or the community.

The impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society has the potential to be significant and severe - ranging from economic instability and loss, through to the degradation of community values and personal safety. The intermingling of organised crime with legitimate activities obscures visibility of the criminal activity and can undermine community trust in its institutions and processes.

The nature of organised crime in Australia

Organised criminal groups in Australia continue to evolve from being communally based, strongly hierarchical, and easily defined by ethnicity or ethos, towards more flexible, loosely associated and entrepreneurial networks. These networks bring together groups and individuals with differing roles and levels of involvement in the criminal activity, and generally involve individuals of different ethnicities, skill sets and criminal interests. Some groups form for short periods for specific activities, while others are more enduring. Many exert widespread influence and have the capacity to expand their operations quickly, both domestically and internationally, in order to exploit opportunities or maintain competitive advantage.

Networks comprising syndicates and independent individuals are still formed on an ad hoc basis to meet demand or exploit specific crime markets. This enables more flexibility in criminal activity and allows movement within and between sectors.

Higher threat organised criminal groups are typically flexible, entrepreneurial and resistant to law enforcement intervention. They are innovative and able to identify and enter new markets and create opportunities for profit from illegal activity. The sectors or goods targeted by organised crime are often areas where little criminal activity has been detected, or where regulations or criminal penalties are yet to be fully established or currently provide insufficient deterrent.

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Organised criminal groups able to access the resources required to exploit these opportunities will continue to present the greatest potential harm to Australian society and offer ongoing challenges for law enforcement.

The most likely future scenario is that Australia will continue to be threatened by an increasing variety of serious and organised criminal groups² (SOCGs), whose evolution towards flatter and more flexible structural arrangements will continue, predominantly as a result of their operating environment. Furthermore, the criminal capabilities of SOCGs are likely to strengthen over time in response to law enforcement focus and competition between groups. The profitability of traditional and non-traditional organised crime markets is likely to remain high, ensuring strong and continuing SOCG motivation to engage in criminality.

Practices and methods

Consistent with global trends, criminal groups operating in Australia are adopting business practices and methodologies that enable them to be more flexible and sophisticated in their operations. The more resilient groups are developing planning processes that enable them to exploit new criminal opportunities and enhance their counter-intelligence and counter-investigative capabilities. These groups are better able to adapt to changes in demand for illicit goods and services and, in some cases, influence the shape of the markets.

An increasing number of domestic organised criminal groups are also developing and strengthening regional and global partnerships designed specifically to facilitate the physical movement of illicit goods or commodities across national borders. These partnerships are providing domestic organised criminal groups with access to increased resources and providing transnational criminal groups with greater exposure to Australian crime markets.

A growing number of Australian-based criminal groups are increasingly making use of professional facilitators or service providers, such as financial advisors, lawyers, accountants and migration and tax agents. This use may be legitimate with the service provider unaware of the organised crime association, or collusive, where the service provider is a knowing participant in the criminal activity. Increasing complexity in the regulatory environment will continue to drive the demand for the acquisition of such professional services.

² Serious and organised criminal groups are any combination of criminal group, syndicate or network of associated individuals engaged in serious and organised criminal activity.

Serious and organised crime markets and activities

SOCGs will continue to have considerable influence over Australia's criminal environment, with a majority of nationally significant groups involved in illicit commodity markets, especially drugs. Illicit drug markets in Australia are dominated by, and fundamental to, organised crime at all levels, with some groups relying substantially on the profits and networking derived from distribution activities to finance and support other criminal activities.

The potential for organised criminal groups looking to expand activities by actively marketing and expanding supply of illicit commodities in Australia remains a notable threat to the Australian community and one which is a high priority for law enforcement agencies. In addition to the significant increase in domestic amphetamine production, for example, there is evidence of increased involvement by organised criminal groups in both the production and distribution of cannabis. This has been accompanied by greater sophistication in the methodologies used to produce cannabis, larger scale of production, and some evidence of the more potent sections of the cannabis plant being more readily available than previously.

While continuing to maintain a strong presence in traditional illicit markets, organised criminal groups will remain significant facilitators of a broad range of criminal activities in Australia. These include crime types as diverse as high-tech/computer crime, intellectual property crime and environmental crime. Organised criminal groups will expand their influence by increasingly exploiting opportunities and vulnerabilities presenting in the mainstream economy.

Organised criminal groups will also continue to be attracted to opportunities for substantial levels of fraud across the financial sector (including superannuation, banks and securities) and in other related industries such as telecommunications and insurance. Characteristics of these sectors that are especially attractive to criminal groups include the availability of 'arm's length' transactions and the growth, size and complexity of the markets, particularly those that facilitate cross-border trade.

There are indications that organised criminal groups are continuing to seek legitimate involvement in key industries, such as transport, security, finance and telecommunications. This involvement is designed to plan, support, conceal and facilitate their criminal activities. However, even the most highly sophisticated groups are likely to continue to use traditional tactics such as intimidation, coercion and extortion to further their interests.

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Money laundering

The capacity to legitimise the proceeds of crime is a major component of virtually all criminal activity and money laundering will be a continuing significant feature of serious and organised crime. The ability to launder the proceeds of crime allows criminals to acquire individual wealth, either directly or through legitimate business interests underwritten by laundered funds.

In Australia, the most commonly reported money laundering methodology occurs through the regulated financial system. However, criminals are also making increasing use of underground remittance systems and professional facilitators to structure legitimate business enterprises to camouflage criminal proceeds.

The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime has stated that “estimates of the amount of money laundered globally in one year have ranged between \$500 billion and \$1 trillion”.³ The likely extent of money laundering in and through Australia has been estimated to be at least \$3.5 billion⁴ and represents, among other consequences, a significant loss to taxation revenue. Furthermore, money laundering places a sizeable financial burden on associated regulatory and law enforcement response/control measures as well as on private sector companies.

Technology

While technological advances have provided new and more effective capabilities for law enforcement, they have also improved the capabilities available to organised criminal groups. An increasingly large range of offences are committed using computers, the rapid pace driven by advances in technology. These crimes range from high incidence, nuisance activities such as spam emails, through to less frequent, but high-impact activities such as cyber-based extortion and fraud. Advances in technology, often low cost and readily available, are increasing the effectiveness of many of these criminal activities. For example, technological advances in computer software and hardware have combined to provide criminals with very powerful desktop publishing tools capable of copying and producing high quality fake or forged documents, including identity documents.

³ http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/money_laundering.html

⁴ 1995 Austrac report *Estimates of the Extent of Money Laundering in and Throughout Australia* by John Walker Consulting Services

The criminal exploitation of technology is diverse, flexible and opportunistic. Attacks may be carried out against users or providers of technology for financial profit, including offences such as 'phishing', fraud or malicious attack through the use of Trojan viruses.

The incidence of high-tech/cybercrime in Australia is likely to further increase and diversify with a shift through third generation to fourth generation technologies and the introduction of new internet protocols. Access to technology such as high-level encryption devices is providing criminals with the means to minimise detection by law enforcement.

Technological innovations and the rapid increase in mechanisms that can be used to disguise identity will continue to be a major challenge for law enforcement. They heighten the potential for criminal groups to establish highly coordinated and geographically widespread criminal networks. An internet-based network making use of readily available security tools, for example, is likely to be highly resistant to detection. The flexibility and anonymity offered by technological innovations gives these networks potential to rapidly expand and communicate with little increase in visibility.

Identity crime

Concerted and coordinated efforts are being made to strengthen identity verification procedures. However, organised criminal groups will continue to seek to exploit vulnerabilities and opportunities. Indicators of continuing criminal engagement include theft of materials and equipment used to manufacture proof of identity documentation, the compromise of third-parties responsible for the storage of identity-related information of Australians, and the use of corrupt public officials in the criminal distribution of genuine documents.

Measures to counter identity crime in the banking, finance and insurance sectors are likely to displace related crimes to other areas of the economy, as well as to drive organised criminal groups towards increasingly sophisticated identity crime methodologies and opportunities.

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Transnational crime

The trend towards transnational crime can be largely attributed to the introduction of technologies designed to quicken the pace, volume and scope of commercial activity and a world wide trend toward more open economies, supported by mechanisms such as free trade agreements. Designed to facilitate legitimate international commercial activity, these developments are not only enhancing the flow of labour, capital, intellectual property and goods and services, but also have the potential to mask the trafficking of a variety of prohibited goods or illicit commodities or the establishment of front companies and quasi-legitimate businesses.

Growth in modern communications and other technologies, as well as increasingly open global financial markets, will continue to provide new opportunities for organised criminal groups and networks to operate across national borders and at a geographical distance from their victims. Increased geographic flexibility has allowed organised crime to exploit differences in international legislative and regulatory frameworks and criminal penalties to obtain greater degrees of protection from law enforcement and to increase the potential for the generation of criminal profits.

Term of reference (b) - Strategies for countering future serious and organised crime

The underlying strategy that guides the approach taken by the ACC to support a concerted attack on serious and organised crime is to deliver an integrated criminal intelligence and operational capacity that draws its strength from effective collaboration with, and engagement of, partner agencies and other relevant organisations, including the private sector.

At the most strategic level, it is critical that Australian law enforcement maintains the capability to assess the changing nature of the strategic criminal environment and identify the major developments that look set to occur in Australia's crime markets in the future. The ACC plays a pivotal role in providing this 'over-the-horizon' criminal intelligence perspective through the production of a broad range of strategic intelligence assessments. These products, combined with the effective delivery by the Commission of other criminal information services, provide the foundation for shaping effective and sustained responses to serious and organised crime.

The continued delivery of these capabilities will be supported significantly by increased holdings in the national Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID), which is hosted by the ACC. These holdings are derived through collection from law enforcement partners and other agencies, both domestic and international, as well as through joint investigations and operations, including intelligence operations and investigations authorised by the ACC Board.

Expanding law enforcement's knowledge of organised crime is one of the ACC's key objectives. Increased understanding of the changing world of organised crime and the criminal marketplace will inform and influence future Australian law enforcement strategies and operations. Raising community and private sector awareness of organised criminal activities and methodologies is an important component of this approach. Appropriate media strategies that highlight successful operations and prosecutions, combined with the release of publications such as the ACC's annual Illicit Drug Data Report, will both encourage members of the public and the business sector to provide information to assist law enforcement efforts and deter some criminal activity.

The relationships the ACC has with Board member agencies and other partners, and the strong cooperation that has been achieved through Task Forces, joint investigations, joint intelligence operations, secondments and other collaborative arrangements, have been, and will continue to be, fundamental platforms for the significant disruption of serious and organised criminal groups.

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To implement effective targeting strategies to combat serious and organised crime in Australia, the ACC, with assistance from law enforcement partners, is measuring the characteristics of organised crime including its size, scope, growth, offences of choice, methods of operation, levels of violence, changing commodities and crime markets. Through benchmarking with international counterparts, the ACC is confident that it has some of the most sophisticated approaches to understanding the criminal environment.

Operationally, collaborative, multi-disciplinary interagency activity which is flexible in approach and both proactive and forward looking in nature, as well as effectively responding to the specific criminal activity, needs to remain a cornerstone of law enforcement's efforts to counter serious and organised crime.

The ACC's multi-agency Board approved Task Force approach has proved particularly effective in generating valuable intelligence and investigative outcomes nationally. It has provided the mechanism through which a coordinated and targeted response to serious criminal activity can be achieved in a time critical environment. It is a highly successful method of engaging partner agencies, who supply resources commensurate to the level and nature of the targeted activity within their jurisdiction or sphere of responsibility.

The Task Force approach has progressively evolved through the experience of investigations and intelligence operations, and through the direction of the ACC Board. The Task Force model is an intelligence-based process which involves:

- identifying and profiling nationally significant criminal groups, including developing insights into their activities, structures and methodologies;
- assessing the level of threat represented by each group;
- considering and selecting operational response options in relation to those groups that represent the highest threat;
- building a multi-disciplinary team that includes the specific skill sets required to disrupt the identified high threat groups; and
- conducting investigations and operations utilising various intelligence and evidence collection methods, including the coercive powers.

Following the money trail and aggressively pursuing proceeds of crime action are also strategies that continue to prove effective in the disruption of serious and organised criminal groups. While the ACC has enjoyed some success in this area, it has recently revised its approach to targeting high threat groups to give greater emphasis to the investigation of unexplained wealth and to criminal exploitation of legitimate commerce to conceal illicit profits.

The ACC Board may determine that an intelligence operation or investigation into matters relating to federally relevant criminal activity⁵ is a special operation or special investigation, therefore authorising the use of the coercive powers under the Act. Before making such determinations, the Board must consider whether methods of collecting the criminal information and intelligence that do not involve the use of those powers have been effective or, in the case of an investigation, whether ordinary police methods of investigation are likely to be effective.

The ACC's coercive powers are instrumental to achieving operational results and collecting significant criminal intelligence, both in ACC and joint agency activities. The powers generate insight into the intentions, methodologies and funding of criminal groups and networks, and the roles of individuals. They also provide the opportunity to identify and explore actual and potential vulnerabilities of these groups. Combined with the range of traditional investigative methods, including telephone interception, surveillance devices and controlled operations, the coercive powers continue to provide one of the most effective and unique mechanisms through which serious and organised crime can be targeted.

In the course of conducting investigations and operations, including coercive examinations, the ACC also derives significant criminal information and intelligence which, while incidental to its own activities, is of interest to one or more of its partners. This actionable intelligence is disseminated to relevant agencies under the provisions of the Act and has frequently resulted in successful operational outcomes.

The establishment of international connections by domestic SOCGs, combined with the targeting of Australia by criminal groups and networks based overseas and the expansion of transnational crime generally, will heighten the need for the ACC to continue to receive timely and comprehensive intelligence through the international liaison networks and established international cooperation frameworks of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) and the Australian Customs Service (ACS). The capacity of these two agencies to maintain and extend the delivery of criminal information and intelligence on which the ACC can draw to inform the national criminal intelligence picture will be a key element of countering future serious and organised crime. At the same time, the continuation of off-shore activity by the AFP, which has achieved significant outcomes in dismantling groups targeting Australia, will remain a critically important component of future national strategies.

⁵ For the purposes of the ACC Act, federally relevant criminal activity is, essentially, serious and organised crime that is an offence against the law of the Commonwealth or a Territory, or an offence against the law of a State that has a federal aspect (ss4(1) and ss4A(2) refer).

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Collaboration between law enforcement, wider government and industry is vital to generating effective responses to serious and organised crime – both in building the understanding of a changing criminal environment and in developing strategies that combine the strengths of operational law enforcement activity, regulatory and legislative change and community involvement. Partnerships between law enforcement, industry specialists and government offer the opportunity for law enforcement to build its capability and to increasingly access specialised skills and tools.

The ACC has, for example, applied significant effort to developing relationships in the finance sector and has received strong cooperation in response. This engagement has provided the ACC with the opportunity to further understand the nature and depth of fraud in the private sector and facilitated access to previously unreported fraud events and other data. It has also enabled the ACC and partner agencies to undertake target development work on previously unknown organised criminal groups. Through this collaboration, the ACC is also able to alert industry to new and emerging criminal practices and maintain avenues of communication that provide timely insights into the level and nature of criminal activity.

At the same time, industry groups are actively and successfully working with law enforcement through forums such as the National Working Group on the Prevention of the Diversion of Precursor Chemicals into Illicit Drug Manufacture (chaired by the Attorney-General's Department), applying their expertise and knowledge to support and assist the development of legislative reforms and other proposals to counter criminal activity as well as providing an important avenue for the education of their members.

A continuation of flexible, innovative responses and effective partnerships between governments, law enforcement agencies and the private sector is fundamental to maintain a concerted attack on serious and organised crime and to protect the Australian community. The importance of this approach is likely to grow if, as predicted, organised crime seeks to exploit areas of legitimate commercial activity previously largely unaffected by criminality.

Term of reference (c) - The economic cost of countering future organised crime at a national and state and territory level

As social pressures and new opportunities for organised crime develop, the ACC and other law enforcement agencies will continue to be challenged to be flexible, innovative and forward-looking. Effective law enforcement responses to organised crime will require highly specialised operational policing and, increasingly, the acquisition of understanding about opportunities and dynamics driving changes in organised criminal behaviour. It will also require the development of initiatives that will help create an environment more resistant to organised criminal activity.

In addition, there will be a need for the ACC to effectively harness new and developing technologies, continue to build its technical infrastructure to provide for increasingly complex analyses, and maintain effective information management practices. Furthermore, with increasing levels of transnational crime, demands on translation and related services will rise.

In response to a resolution of the Intergovernmental Committee of the Australian Crime Commission in late 2004, the ACC Board requested that the ACC coordinate the development of an appropriate performance assessment framework. In collaboration with partners, the ACC has completed stage one of a two stage project to capture both effectiveness and efficiency performance dimensions of intelligence and operational law enforcement activity targeting serious and organised crime. The project aims to refine the ACC's performance measurement frameworks to enable a more accurate measurement and estimation of the costs of serious and organised crime, the effects of activity in mitigating and reducing these costs, and the associated return on investment metrics. The ACC Board is receiving periodic updates on the findings of this project.

While the ACC is not in a position to offer a specific comment on the economic cost of countering future organised crime, it is clear that the increasingly flexible nature of SOCGs and the extension of their activities across a range of illicit and legitimate markets continue to require informed decisions to be made about the application of the resources available to law enforcement. Agencies need to maintain effective mechanisms through which to present proposals to governments in support of additional funding where appropriate. In addition, strengthening research activity into the cost of countering organised crime by relevant government and non-government institutions will support law enforcement efforts.

Term of reference (d) - The adequacy of legislative and administrative arrangements, including the adequacy of cross-jurisdictional databases, to meet future needs

The ACC Act and legislation such as that covering telephone interception, controlled operations and surveillance devices provide the ACC with a range of functions and powers that recognise the need for the Commission to engage in investigative and other activity that is inherently intrusive. These powers are appropriately balanced by overarching internal and external governance and accountability arrangements that provide an ongoing level of scrutiny. At the same time, the secrecy provisions in the Act and exemptions from, for example, privacy legislation, provide the ACC with the protection necessary to prevent the exposure of its methods and operations to criminal groups.

While these legislative and administrative arrangements are considered adequate to address the current criminal environment, it may be necessary in the future to consider amendments to counter the increasing sophistication of serious and organised criminal activity. While acknowledging potential community unease in relation to increases in law enforcement powers, the high level negative impact of serious and organised crime may require consideration of such approaches in the future. Community awareness of the impact of serious and organised crime on Australian society is essential to inform debate on any future proposals for strengthening law enforcement capacity.

The ACC continues to actively contribute to legislative and administrative reform proposals, and where necessary to address any inadequacies in ACC powers to investigate serious and organised crime. Continued scrutiny of legislation, including through post operational analysis of the outcomes of investigations and intelligence operations, to identify gaps in regulatory controls is essential. Recent amendments to cash reporting obligations introduced through the *Anti-Money Laundering and Counter-Terrorism Financing Act 2006* are a strong example of the recognition of the need for enhanced law enforcement capacity in a specific area. Ongoing examination of the operational impacts of legislation governing information exchange between agencies to identify impediments to the efficient sharing of criminal information and intelligence is also critical.

The ACC continues to support successful prosecutions for witnesses failing to cooperate at ACC examinations. There are currently amendments to section 33 of the ACC Act before the Parliament (see item 45 of the *Crimes Legislation (National Investigative Powers and Witness Protection) Bill 2006*), aimed at reversing the onus of proof in relation to an element of the offence.

Cross-jurisdictional databases

The Australian Criminal Intelligence Database

The legislated functions of the ACC include the maintenance of a national database of criminal information and intelligence. That national database is the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID). ACID provides a secure, centralised national repository for analysis and retrieval of data on entities (such as persons and organisations) and their attributes, and is used by all Australian police forces and a range of other government agencies.

ACID provides facilities for the sharing of criminal intelligence nationally. This promotes a consistent, multi-agency response to emerging national crime trends. ACID's strength lies in its ability to highlight the interrelationships and dependencies that exist within and between entities and attributes within criminal networks. It enables law enforcement agencies to develop effective tactical responses to combat and dismantle the activities of SOCGs.

Over the past year, a number of analytical capability enhancements were made to ACID including:

- bulk search capability;
- network analysis (charting) capability;
- sVENN capability – a method of integrating results from multiple searches against ACID;
- full spatial mapping analytical capability;
- geo-coding of existing addresses and upload and download facilities; and
- testing of concept management tools to enhance the knowledge and understanding of the vast amounts of criminal intelligence data stored within ACID.

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Release of these tools has substantially enhanced the value of ACID to intelligence users. This is demonstrated by a marked increase in the use of the system - a 23 percent increase in ACID searches and a 15 percent increase in document uploads in 2006 compared with 2005.

The ACC is currently implementing very advanced multi-layered network analysis capability for release later this year. This will enable, for example, identification of links between individuals and syndicates within large quantities of address, bank account, phone number, vehicle registration, licence, etc details. Further analytical enhancements are being considered and the ACC is currently exploring advanced options with a number of agencies and firms in the United States of America, Canada, the United Kingdom and Europe.

The ACC is implementing a portal which among other benefits will enable greater engagement with private sector agencies. This will leverage considerable cooperation between the ACC and the private sector in the collection and analysis of high-volume identity and other fraud-related information.

The Standard Intelligence Exchange Format

The Standard Intelligence Exchange Format (SIEF), formulated by the ACC, is designed to develop and support information exchange standards and processes to enable jurisdictions to effectively share information. SIEF is not a software program or a computer system, but a set of standards facilitating information exchange amongst law enforcement agencies that allows disparate systems to share, exchange, accept, and translate information.

SIEF will:

- facilitate intelligence sharing through ACID by standardising file types;
- provide a standard mechanism for sharing information which will assist in increasing the types and volume of data held in ACID; and
- provide resources to law enforcement agencies to improve information management and dissemination not only between their databases and ACID but also between their databases and those of other jurisdictions.

The SIEF Project encourages information sharing and provides practical support to jurisdictions to achieve this. This initiative has created a positive impact on national intelligence holdings within ACID and law enforcement agencies are embracing the approach. Currently the ACC is working with all state police forces and the Northern Territory Police to implement SIEF connectivity between ACID and each jurisdiction's databases. The ACC aims to implement SIEF during 2007.

