Frequently asked media questions

The Australian Crime Commission is Australia’s national criminal intelligence agency.

The ACC manages the Australian Criminal Intelligence Database (ACID) which is an intelligence document repository that centralises national criminal information and intelligence on persons, places, communications and organisations as well the relationships between these entities.

There are currently 25 agencies with access to ACID and it contains more than 1.2 million entries.

The information contained in the Organised Crime in Australia report is an unclassified risk and threat analysis based on:

• intelligence holdings in ACID
• intelligence and analysis from the ACC-led National Criminal Intelligence Fusion Capability
• contextual material from ACC Board agencies, state crime commissions, federal government departments, academic literature and open source information.

Those agencies which have contributed material and have specific expertise and knowledge with the subject matter have been consulted in the development of the OCA.

The ACC has a diverse workforce model comprised of APS staff and secondees from police and other agencies, to deliver the outcomes required of the organisation by the ACC Board and the wider community.

The ACC’s intelligence operations and investigations draw on multidisciplinary teams consisting of lawyers, seconded police officers, financial investigators, intelligence analysts, surveillance staff, monitoring staff, investigators, operations support staff and specialist staff seconded from other agencies. The core business of the ACC is supported by staff from areas such as people management, financial services and resource management, information and communication technology, information management, internal audit, public relations, business planning and reporting, strategic policy and corporate management.

People join the ACC either through a general recruitment activity, as particular jobs become available or by way of secondment from another government agency or state police force. From time to time the ACC uses contractor staff for highly specialist and/or urgent staffing requirements. The ACC has arrangements with partner agencies where seconded staff and other capacities are leveraged in close collaboration with these agencies.

Two models of criminal infiltration within the maritime sector have been identified:

• Trusted insiders — individuals or small groups who share information with external criminal entities to help enable their criminal activities.
• Internal Facilitators — internal groups who collude to exploit vulnerabilities and directly participate in criminal activity.

The ACC considers the potential for organised criminal infiltration into the air and maritime sectors to be a very serious matter. The ACC has previously undertaken two special intelligence operations to gain an understanding of potential criminal infiltration in the transport, air and maritime sectors; the Crime in the Transport Sector special intelligence operation and the Illegal Maritime Importation and Movement Methodologies determination.

Intelligence from these special intelligence operations revealed criminal activity at the majority of ports in Australia. Criminal infiltration in the maritime sector was shown to be involved with the importation of illicit commodities, including illicit drugs, into Australia. We have also identified the presence of organised criminal networks and outlaw motorcycle gangs in the maritime sector.

The ACC disseminates criminal intelligence, including any possible examples of criminal infiltration, to law enforcement agencies where relevant. We know from our partner agencies that ACC intelligence disseminations have helped inform individual agency responses to this matter.

We have also provided our partner agencies with a strategic picture of the potential vulnerabilities of the maritime and air sectors to criminal infiltration. The aim of this work is to allow industry to develop strategies to protect themselves against serious and organised crime.

Please note that this determination concluded on 31 December 2008.

Criminals may use gambling outlets to facilitate money laundering activities by placing illegal proceeds of crime into gaming machines or purchasing casino chips only to cash out the chips shortly afterwards.

Money laundering is the way criminals conceal or disguise the proceeds of their crimes. To do this, money launderers endeavour to take three steps:

1. Money must be placed in the financial system without arousing suspicion.
2. Money is moved around or layered, to create complex money trails which make it difficult to identify its original source.
3. Money is integrated or moved back into the financial system for end use so that it appears as legitimate funds or assets. This may involve buying real estate and luxury assets, or investing in businesses, or gambling.

Identity fraudsters are looking for any personal information which they can use to obtain a financial benefit by adopting your identity. This includes names, dates of birth, credit card details, other financial details and emails/phone numbers of friends and business associates.

Compromised financial information can be used directly to attempt to access the victims accounts, or be used to obtain credit cards/ loans in the victims name.

For example, fraudsters have even been known to send SMS and emails from a compromised identity to victims friends and associates, asking for money on the victims behalf. This often involves a story in regards to the victim being stranded somewhere and requiring the funds urgently.

The Government has a range of initiatives aimed at protecting Australian home users from online and identity fraud.

The Australian Government’s Stay Smart Online’ website³ provides information for users about the steps they can take to protect their personal and financial information online and through their mobile phones.

The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) SCAMwatch website⁴ provides information to consumers and small businesses on how to recognise and avoid scams, including those committed online.

You can report online scams through the SCAMwatch website or the Infocentre on 1300 302 502.

The ACCC investigates reports and may refer complainants to other agencies, or to law enforcement authorities, where appropriate.

You can also report any online incidents to Crime Stoppers on 1800 333 000.

The Attorney-General’s Department is currently working with industry to reduce the potential for harm to businesses and consumers from fraud. As the banking and finance sector is increasingly being targeted by cyber- and identity-crime and fraud, the Attorney-General’s Department is considering arrangements to share information with those businesses about the risks they face and how they can be managed.

• www.staysmartonline.gov.au
• www.scamwatch.gov.au

ACC intelligence indicates that the cost of card skimming to the Australian community may be in the tens of millions.

The ACC is actively working with the banking industry to get an accurate picture of the loss to Australian account holders from card skimming.

The Australian Bankers Association recommends that the public take the following precautions:

Retailers, whether large or small, are also advised to be alert to the threat of card skimming and take appropriate measures to secure their EFTPOS terminals to help prevent criminal activity.

• Always be careful to shield your PIN when using an ATM or EFTPOS terminal. Use a free hand to cover the key pad while you enter your PIN.
• You should treat your card like it is cash and make sure you never lose sight of it. If possible, don’t give your card to a waiter or shop assistant and let them walk out of your sight.
• Be vigilant in checking your statements. Always report any unauthorised or suspicious transactions billed to your account and contact your bank immediately, even if the unauthorised transaction is a very small amount.
• Make it a priority to get your card back after completing a purchase. Sometimes cards are intentionally retained by salespeople in order to later commit fraud.
• You may wish to lower your card limit which prevents a criminal spending more than the determined amount if the card was ever lost, stolen or cloned.
  Retailers, whether large or small, are also advised to be alert to the threat of card skimming and take appropriate measures to secure their EFTPOS terminals to help prevent criminal activity.

The ACC estimates organised crime costs the Australian community between $10 and $15 billion annually, with at least $6 billion of these funds sent offshore. These results are consistent with international estimates as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP). The ACC is working with the Australian Institute of Criminology to further understand the costs of organised crime to the Australian community. A report on this work is due to be released in the first half of 2010.

The ACC and Australian law enforcement are well aware of the potential money laundering vulnerabilities presented by the precious metals sector.

The illicit diamond trade may appeal to organised criminals seeking to disguise criminal proceeds due to the high value for volume, difficulties in tracing origin, and ease with which they can be transported across borders.

The Fusion Centre will not be conducting online investigations.

However, a broad range of criminal activities and criminal groups will be targeted through the Fusion Capability, to support partner agencies and deliver against the ACC’s current determinations which include the following special intelligence operations and investigations:

• Amphetamine Type Stimulants and New Synthetic Drugs
• Child Sex Offences
• Cocaine
• Complex Organised Technology Enabled Crime, including Identity Crime
• Established Criminal Networks – Victoria
• High Risk Crime Groups and High Risk Crime Groups – South Australia
• Illicit Firearm Markets – New South Wales
• Indigenous Violence or Child Abuse
• Money Laundering
• People Smuggling
• Serious Organised Crime Penetration of the Border
• Superannuation and Investment Fraud
• Terrorism
• Wickenby Matters.

• The Fusion Capability brings together people from a range of Government agencies, with a range of expertise and unique skills, and access to their own agencies’ information holdings, who work collaboratively to provide a more comprehensive picture of the targets, risks, threats and vulnerabilities associated with criminal activity.
• Creating a co-located, multi-agency team is a practical and cost-effective solution to ensure that information and intelligence is shared lawfully and in a timely manner. It means that data can be fused in near real-time, the results analysed and fed back to agencies to act upon.

• A broad range of criminal activities and criminal groups will be targeted through the Fusion capability, including those involved in people smuggling, money laundering and narcotics importation.
• Tracking and analysing money flows is critical to uncovering criminal enterprises — it can help establish how criminals finance their operations, uncover their methodologies, identify who is involved and, in particular, who is reaping the profits.
• The Fusion Capability will boost our ability to identify high risk cash flows, patterns of crime and the individuals behind it, businesses and corporate structures which may be involved in criminal enterprises in Australia and overseas.

• The central hub of the Fusion Capability is housed in the Australian Crime Commission’s National Headquarters in Canberra. This hub houses the centralised engine and data warehouse for the Fusion Capability, and its command and leadership, data managers and relevant support staff.
• Additional hubs will be established in a number of other ACC offices to conduct analysis of key findings linked with stakeholders located in other states.

No, I am not aware of specific issues raised in relation to the Amphetamine Type Stimulants and New Synthetic Drugs Special Intelligence Operation (ATS SIO). As noted above, the ACC Board recently endorsed the continuation of this determination and there have been very significant results delivered through this work as already outlined.

However, I am aware of some concerns that some jurisdictions have expressed regarding the functional performance of the National Clan Lab Database (NCLD).

Planning for the NCLD commenced in 2003 under the Attorney-General’s Department (AGD). AGD conducted an options evaluation study and nominated ACC to design, implement and maintain the NCLD.

In May 2005, the ACC Board agreed in-principle to host the NCLD.
All state and territory policing jurisdictions were represented on the NCLD User Advisory Group (UAG) which worked with the ACC and AGD to facilitate the construction, implementation, use and ongoing operation of the NCLD.

The UAG provided recommendations to the ACC and AGD on the construction of the database, the type of information that would be collected, how information would be used and system access requirements.

The ACC received funding of $2.048m over two years from AGD to develop the NCLD under the National Precursor Strategy.

The ACC spent a total of $1.97m to design, construct and implement the NCLD.
The ACC has not received any additional funding for upgrades or maintenance to the database.

Once the database had been rolled out and was being employed in the field, some users started to express a desire for the system to provide features that they had not initially considered.

As at 2 December 2010, the ACC has recorded 262 user requests relating to the NCLD. The majority of these are requests for access for new users. Some requests were for additional features or reports of system defects. All 262 requests have been processed and issues resolved.

On 25 October 2010, the ACC commenced a proactive formal consultation with users of the NCLD to determine their satisfaction with the database and identify areas for improvement.

This consultation is continuing, with several jurisdictions yet to provide their feedback.

Once all feedback has been received, the ACC will consult with all jurisdictions to confirm the collective priorities for remediation. After this process the ACC will then determine which remediation and enhancement actions can be undertaken, noting there needs to be careful consideration of the suggested use of Internet based portals for the NCLD. Protecting the integrity of the information contained in the NCLD is our primary priority.

Organised crime is motivated by profit, and the trade in illicit drugs continues to be the primary source of profit for serious and organised crime in Australia.

Australia has proven to be an attractive market for illicit drugs which often provides a high return on investment for drug suppliers and traffickers.

Mexico has emerged as the top embarkation point for cocaine over the past two years.

Each year, the ACC develops and publishes a comprehensive national picture of the overall illicit drug market (the Illicit Drug Data Report), by collating data on seizures and intelligence from a broad range of partner agencies, including law enforcement, forensic laboratories and relevant Commonwealth agencies.

Cocaine seized at the border is submitted to the Australian Illicit Drug Data Centre within the Australian Federal Police, and forensically examined to identify regions of origins and manufacturing trends.

The Australian Crime Commission also draws on its specialist investigative capabilities including its Coercive Powers, to build a comprehensive picture of organised crime in Australia, and identify the highest risk threats to the Australian community.

The Australian Government has recognised the need for better national guidelines for cleaning up clandestine laboratories (clan labs).

As noted in the Australian Crime Commission’s (ACC’s) Illicit Drug Data Report, in 2008–09 approximately 70 per cent of clandestine laboratories seized in Australia were located in residential properties. The proliferation of clandestine laboratories in residential areas poses significant risks to the environment and the community.

People living in these toxic households are exposed to dangerous chemicals and possible health risks that can impact on them for the rest of their lives. Children are particularly vulnerable to the effects of exposure to dangerous chemicals.

The ACC has provided technical expertise to the Attorney-General’s Department to develop the Clandestine Laboratory Remediation Guidelines.

The guidelines will provide a valuable step-by-step process to determine whether a site is contaminated and how to go about remediation.

They will be available for use by government and non-government bodies responsible for dealing with clandestine laboratories, including regulatory authorities, police, local governments and service providers.

The Attorney-General’s Department has advised that guidelines are expected to be finalised by March 2011.

It is difficult to estimate the size of the cocaine market. This is because we only have statistics on cocaine detections by law enforcement, not the total amount of drugs available and because of variable prices across jurisdictions and weights.

Although the cocaine market in Australia is relatively small compared to other drugs such as cannabis and amphetamine-type stimulants, cocaine is an increasing commodity of choice and a lucrative market for organised crime. In 2007-08 the number of cocaine detections at the Australian border increased by 71 per cent, and the number of cocaine seizures was the highest on record

The ACC believes it is most likely that groups involved in the cocaine market are also involved in other illicit drug markets and illegal activity. Successful organised crime groups are flexible and have a presence across many sectors and crime types.

Any board member agency can ask for the ACC’s assistance in providing services such as intelligence, the use of coercive powers and the establishment and maintenance of criminal data-base services.

In this case the board member agency was NSW Police who requested assistance in examining the diversion of licit firearms into the illicit market.

Firearms trafficking, particularly the illicit movement of firearms and firearm parts across state borders is of ongoing concern to jurisdictional authorities. Firearms also aid criminal activity and can be used to strengthen an organised crime group's market position.

This determination has similar objectives to the previous national illicit firearm markets determination, but allows for a focus on state offences without a federal aspect.

The ACC Board approved that in May 2008 and at the last board meeting that was extended to 30 June 2011.

The ACC has provided other state agencies with assistance eg the Criminal Networks Investigation for the Victorian Police and the High-Risk Crime groups determination for the South Australian Police.

Money and power are the key drivers for organised crime and firearms form part of organised crime's ability to display power, intimidate and threaten violence. A large variety of organised crime groups are involved in handling guns and some are involved in trafficking. Firearms trafficking can involve people with no criminal history, through to more sophisticated organised crime groups, including outlaw motorcycle gangs.

The ACC’s National Indigenous Violence and Child Abuse Intelligence Task Force (Task Force) been extended until 30 June 2012.

The Task Force will continue developing a national picture of child abuse and violence in Indigenous communities, and is aimed at providing intelligence to assist agencies, at both Commonwealth and State level, to strengthen community safety in remote communities as a whole.

The Inter-Governmental Committee of the ACC (IGC-ACC) commissioned a report from the NIITF when the NIITF was formed in September 2006. The PCIIC report is a comprehensive assessment of the intelligence collected by the NIITF over the past three years.

The PCIIC report has been disseminated to ACC Board member agencies, relevant Commonwealth, state and territory government departments, key Commonwealth Ministers and the Commonwealth Attorney-General. The report will be presented to the IGC-ACC when they next meet in November. State and territory Attorneys-General have also been briefed on the report.

Information contained in the PCIIC report has been derived from a number of confidential sources-including the application of the ACC's coercive powers. Information derived from the ACC's coercive powers is protected under the secrecy provisions of the ACC Act. These secrecy provisions protect the identity of people who have spoken to the ACC and the information they have provided.

Through the important work of the National Indigenous Violence and Child Abuse Intelligence Task Force (NIITF), the ACC is providing to key stakeholders, a comprehensive national picture on the nature and extent of violence and child abuse in Indigenous communities, including issues surrounding poor information sharing and reporting, and abuse of power that facilitates violence, child abuse and other crime.

As part of the work of the NIITF, the ACC board approved the use of coercive powers to overcome impediments to accessing information about indigenous violence and child abuse. The coercive powers are exercised by statutory independent examiners under a strict legislative framework that includes appropriately strong secrecy provisions in order to protect the information the ACC gathers.

The ACC will continue to manage the work of the taskforce in a culturally sensitive manner, with paramount consideration given to the best interests of all indigenous children.

The Australian Crime Commission (ACC) does not comment on operational matters. It is an offence under the ACC Act 2002 to disclose details on the use of coercive powers. This is designed to provide protection and privacy to individuals and organisations involved.

Abuse of power can include the deliberate misuse of power and position to intimidate and threaten victims and witnesses into not reporting criminal activity. It can also include people using their position to benefit financially through nepotism and influence.

The continuation of NIITF over the next 12 months provides an opportunity to focus on abuse of power issues, to deliver unique, empirical data to Government that will inform evidence-based policy and programs

The ACC is aware that there are serious and organised crime groups operating in Australia that have international connections.

Traditional organised crime groups that have specific ethnic connections are giving way to groups that are more flexible and dynamic. These new organised crime groups are often more loosely associated networks that draw on anyone with specific skills who may be able to help them commit the crime.

Serious and organised criminal groups operate across state, territory, national and international borders, with the nature of trans-national organised crime changing all the time.

The ACC estimates that organised crime costs the Australian community between $10 and $15 billion each year, a significant proportion of which will leave the country.

Environmental crime is one of the markets monitored and reported on in the ACC’s Picture of Criminality suite of strategic products. The ACC also undertakes specific assessments on environmental crime as issues are identified, in support of partner agency investigations and operations.

The ACC is involved in regular monitoring of, and liaison with, agencies such as the Australian Government Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities on environmental crime issues.

The ACC also provides intelligence on the impact of organised crime methods on the environment such as the destruction of forests to support the production of safrole oil. Safrole oil is a key precursor for the production of Ecstasy, with approximately 1500 tonnes of safrole rich oils coming out of SE Asia annually. Most of this is from illegal harvesting, with an estimated half a million trees lost annually.

Recent increases in cocaine arrests and reported use, as well as considerable seizures of the drug in recent years indicate a potential expansion of the Australian cocaine market.

Cocaine is not domestically produced and must be sourced from overseas. While cocaine production in Columbia has decreased, Colombia still accounts for approximately 51 per cent of global cocaine production.

Cocaine importations into Australia are dominated by ethnic South Americans and Mexicans, who exploit their strong links with cocaine producers in Columbia, Bolivia and Peru.

A total of 359 cocaine importations were detected in 2008–09. This represented a 43 per cent decrease from 627 detections in 2007–08. This decrease potentially indicates a shift away from smaller ‘scatter’ importations to large importations. However it should be noted that compared with detections since 2002–03 this still represents an increasing trend.

Collaboration, sharing of information and targeted investigations are critical in disrupting the importation of drugs into Australia and keeping them off our streets. The ACC plays a key role in developing a picture of serious and organised crime in Australia by delivering intelligence that its partners can act on to disrupt organised crime threats.

The ACC’s Board has recognised cocaine as a potential growth area and has approved the use of the ACC’s special powers to assist in better understanding the cocaine market in Australia.

The Australian Crime Commission’s Illicit Drug Data Report (IDDR) provides the most current and comprehensive unclassified picture available of Australia’s drug environment—collated from partner agency’s data including law enforcement, forensic laboratories and Commonwealth agencies.

The IDDR 2008–09 shows 449 clandestine laboratories (clan labs) were detected nationally in 2008–09.

Queensland accounted for the majority of clan lab detections, with 148 detections during this period. However, the largest shift in detection numbers occurred in Western Australia which increased from 30 laboratories in
2007–08 to 78 in 2008–09, an increase of 160 per cent.

Clandestine laboratories manufacturing amphetamine-type stimulants (ATS)—primarily amphetamine and methylamphetamine—continue to be the most common type of laboratory detected in Australia. The majority of ATS laboratories were detected in Queensland, with 124 of the total 148 clan labs were found to be manufacturing ATS. This accounts for 39 per cent of the national total for ATS laboratories in 2008-09.

In 2008–09, two-thirds of the clan lab detections were in residential areas, with a further 11.1 per cent in rural areas. Compared with 2007–08, there has been a shift toward the use of a wider range of locations for clan labs. A small number of labs were detected in vehicles, commercial/industrial areas and public places. Other locations included self-storage facilities, hotel/motel and a vehicle at a train station car park.

More current national statistics on drug seizures can not be provided due to the length of time required to validate data from a wide range of sources. The 2009–10 IDDR will be launched mid-2011.

In Australia, the criminal threat posed by Eastern European organised crime groups is serious and remains consistent.

The ACC is monitoring a number of crime groups however in the ACC's judgement, in the current Australian environment, where a fluid and pragmatic approach is adopted by organised crime, it is more appropriate to target groups according to the threat they pose rather than by crime type or ethnicity.

The majority of organised crime groups exist as loosely connected groupings of individuals who collaborate for a common purpose based on their individual criminal contacts, specialist skills and technical expertise. They operate more as networks than structured groups. Their ability to do that has been enhanced by advances in communication through globalisation.

Criminal enterprises tend to be more flexible and resilient to law enforcement targeting. The more resilient organised crime enterprises tend to have a number of interests facilitated by different networks so that if law enforcement succeeds in disrupting part of the syndicate the overall enterprise can regenerate using the surviving hubs.

In January 2007 the OMCG National Intelligence Task Force was developed under the ACC High Risk Crime Groups Determination. The task force was established to support enhanced intelligence sharing on OMCGs and to support investigations through target development. The task force involved the coordinated effort of all state and territory jurisdictions.

While the OMCG National Intelligence Task Force ceased as a formal entity in June 2008, its work was continued and strengthened in June 2008 by the ACC Board’s establishment of the Serious and Organised Crime National Intelligence Task Force. This Task Force develops national intelligence on all serious and organised criminal activities, including those of OMCGs, so that there is a more integrated and comprehensive understanding of the linkages between groups.

Targeting OMCGs under the Serious and Organised Crime National Intelligence Task Force is a highly effective and efficient approach. It enables the ACC to draw on a range of specialised capabilities aimed at fighting high risk crime groups, including OMCGs. It allows the ACC to look at organised crime in a broader context, for example the linkages between high risk crime groups and OMCGs and increases the effectiveness of OMCG intelligence.

The ACC has made a significant contribution towards joint operations with partner law enforcement agencies. For example more than 1500 intelligence disseminations related to OMCG activities were provided to partner agencies from January 2007 to end February 2009.

The vast majority of companies and individuals working in the private security industry are legitimate and provide an excellent service to the Australian community. However, access to firearms, licensed premises, major events, a range of public and private assets provides incentives and opportunities for organised crime groups to infiltrate and exploit the private security industry.

Potential involvement of serious and organised crime in the private security industry can have serious consequences. It can facilitate further criminality such as:

• illicit commodity distribution
• money laundering and suspect currency movements
• property theft.

Project Wickenby, led by the Australian Taxation Office, is hardening the Australian environment against exploitation from highly sophisticated tax evasion schemes in Australia and overseas.

As part of Project Wickenby, the Australian Crime Commission leads Operation Wickenby, which is focussed on exposing the organisers and facilitators of abusive secrecy havens and tax evasion schemes. Operation Youghal is one of the nine criminal investigations under Operation Wickenby.

Therefore, an analysis of the cost of Operation Youghal must be considered in the context of the achievements of Project Wickenby.

As at 31 October 2010, Project Wickenby results include:

• completed of 1664 reviews and audits, raising liabilities of approximately $951.61 million
• a total of 27 criminal investigations underway, with 60 people charged and 14 people convicted of serious offences
• recouped $229.52 million in tax
• achieved a compliance dividend of $301.70 million
• collected $2.1 million in other moneys

In addition, analysis indicates the average net tax payable by taxpayers and their associates touched by Project Wickenby has increased by approximately 276 per cent and 153 per cent respectively, compared to the top 4% of taxpayers with average net tax payable increases of only 30% over the same period.

It should also be noted that Operation Youghal is an ongoing criminal investigation. In his statement on 23 November 2010, the CEO made it clear that he was discontinuing the criminal investigation of Mr Hogan and Mr Cornell, but the investigation of the suspected facilitators of the tax evasion schemes will continue.

Operation Wickenby’s investigation costs often overlap across the nine criminal investigations currently underway. It is therefore difficult to provide an exact breakdown of costs against each individual investigation. However, it is our best estimate that the cost of Operation Youghal to date is in the vicinity of $10 million.

Project Wickenby has involved the coordination of whole-of-government responses to tax fraud and offshore tax havens and the project is focused squarely on holding the promoters and organisers of these abusive secrecy haven arrangements to account.

Project Wickenby also has a strong preventive focus, informing tax payers of the risk of such arrangements, making those arrangements a more hostile environment and strengthening frameworks to ensure such arrangements can be detected earlier. The ACC as a member of Project Wickenby has been in line with and is supportive of this strategy.

It is important to note that every dollar lost to the Australian tax payer as a result of tax evasion schemes impacts on the delivery of essential services such as hospital beds, schools or critical infrastructure.

As at 30 April 2010, 57 people have been charged with indictable offences under Project Wickenby.